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Abstract—In this paper, we explore the partitioning attacks
on the Bitcoin network, which is shown to exhibit spatial
bias, and temporal and logical diversity. Through data-driven
study we highlight: 1) the centralization of Bitcoin nodes across
autonomous systems, indicating the possibility of BGP attacks,
2) the non-uniform consensus among nodes, that can be exploited
to partition the network, and 3) the diversity in the Bitcoin
software usage that can lead to privacy attacks. Atop the prior
work, which focused on spatial partitioning, our work extends
the analysis of the Bitcoin network to understand the temporal
and logical effects on the robustness of the Bitcoin network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bitcoin network consists of nodes that are connected
in a peer-to-peer architecture. These nodes are geographically
spread over the Internet, and they use a gossip protocol
to exchange transactions and blocks. Ideally, Bitcoin nodes
are expected to remain synchronized over the state of the
blockchain in order to maintain a consistent view. Moreover,
the decentralized and distributed network is considered safe
against single point-of-failure. However, these assumptions,
if challenged, may lead to system-wide vulnerabilities and
partitioning attacks, which we explore in this paper.
In Bitcoin, partitioning attacks can be launched against a
group of nodes that: 1) are geographically clustered withing
an autonomous system (AS), 2) have an outdated view of
the blockchain, and 3) are using a vulnerable software client
infected with malware and bugs. As an outcome of each attack,
an adversary can influence the key features and operations of
Bitcoin including the publication of a block, the transaction
confirmation, and the network size. Prior work [1], on parti-
tioning attacks focused on the spatial attack vector, indicating
that Bitcoin nodes are vulnerable to BGP hijacks. In this paper,
we validate their findings and present an up-to-date condition
of the network. Additionally, and novel to our work, we present
more optimized and cost effective attacks that extend into
temporal and logical network frontiers.
Data Collection. For this study, we crawled Bitnodes [2], a
service that maintains a persistent connection with all reach-
able nodes in the Bitcoin network. We used the information
to develop another crawler, atop Bitnodes, to acquire data.
The data contained information including the IP address, the
latest block, and the software client of each node. We used
the IP address of nodes to find their corresponding AS and
organization. For our analysis, we use two datasets: a sample
per minute and a sample per 10 minutes, respectively.
II. PARTITIONING ATTACKS
A. Spatial Partitioning
In spatial partitioning, an adversarial AS or organization
can hijack BGP prefixes of a target AS that hosts a higher
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Fig. 1. CDF of the Bitcoin full nodes in ASes and organizations.
TABLE I. TOP 5 MINING POOLS PER HASH RATE, ASES AND
ORGANIZATION. ALIBABA HAS A VIEW OF ≈ 60% OF THE MINING DATA.
Mining Pool H. Rate % ASes Organizations
BTC.com 25% AS37963 Hangzhou AlibabaAS45102 AliBaba (China)
Antpool 12.4% AS45102 AliBaba (China)
ViaBTC 11.7% AS45102 AliBaba (China)
BTC.TOP 10.3% AS45102 AliBaba (China)
F2Pool 6.3% AS45102 AliBaba (China)AS58563 Chinanet Hubei
12 others 34.3% — —
fraction of Bitcoin nodes and mining pools. As a result, it can
hijack the Bitcoin traffic, isolate the mining power, or simply
harm the reputation of the target AS.
Prior work [1], carried out in 2017, showed that 13 ASes
hosted 30% Bitcoin nodes while 50 ASes hosted 50% Bitcoin
nodes. In our analysis, started on February 28, 2018, we found
that only 8 ASes host 30% of Bitcoin nodes and 24 ASes host
50% of Bitcoin nodes. At the organization level, we found that
only 13 organizations host 50% of the Bitcoin nodes. Among
them, only two organizations host 65.7% of Bitcoin hash rate,
with the leading organization (AliBaba) having a 59.4% share
of Bitcoin the hash rate. This indicates that since 2017, Bitcoin
has become more centralized. In Figure 1, we plot the CDF
of ASes and organizations that host Bitcoin full nodes, and in
Table I, we present the top 5 mining pools along with their
hash rate and distribution across ASes and organizations.
Spatial partitioning can facilitate other major attacks in-
cluding double-spending, consensus delay, eclipse attacks, and
the 51% attack. As shown in Table I, if an attacker hijacks 3
ASes, he can isolate more than 60% of the Bitcoin hash rate.
This can be further extended by individually targeting ASes
and hijacking BGP prefixes. To prevent spatial partitioning,
node hosting should be spread across multiple ASes. This can
resist the centralization and raise the attack cost.
B. Temporal Partitioning
In temporal partitioning, a malicious miner can partition
the network and force users into following a counterfeit
blockchain. The objective of the attacker is the isolation and
ar
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(a) General trend of the network
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(b) One day snapshot
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(c) Consensus between block propaga-
tion
Fig. 2. Temporal consensus in Bitcoin network. Y-axis denotes number of nodes in 1000. In each figure, green region denotes the up-to-date blocks. Yellow
region denotes 1 block behind. Purple, blue, and magenta regions represent nodes that are 2–4, 5–10, and ≥ 10 blocks behind respectively. Figure 2(a) shows
the overall network, Figure 2(b), shows a day (March 25) that offers greater attack opportunity, and Figure 2(c) shows consensus pruning during 10 minutes.
subversion of nodes that are behind the main chain by one or
more blocks. The nodes can be behind the chain due to poor
connectivity, low bandwidth, or network churn.
An attacker with the information of vulnerable nodes can
connect to them and feed them false blocks. To outline the
network’s vulnerability, we plot this temporal diversity of
Bitcoin nodes in Figure 2, where x-axis denotes a time-index
for network observations (one observation every 10 minutes
in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b), and one every minute in
Figure 2(c)). From Figure 2, we were able to make following
observations. 1) Consensus pruning is not uniform across the
network. 2) Generally, a majority (≈ 50%) remains synchro-
nized. 3) 30–40% nodes remain 1–4 blocks behind with respect
to updated nodes. 4) There are vulnerable moments in which
up to 90% of the network is 1–4 blocks behind.
As shown in Figure 2, nodes in the yellow and purple
region are behind the network, and vulnerable to attacks. The
attack recovery will require a fork in which all transactions
will be reversed and UTXO sets will be updated. Standing
out in our analysis is the observation that Bitcoin has a level
of asymmetric vulnerability. With a market capitalization of
o(1011) USD and network configuration of o(104) nodes, each
full node is worth o(107) USD. However, the cost of disrupting
the network is far less than the value being impacted.
Since temporal partitioning has not been studied before,
therefore, effective countermeasures do not exist. However, we
propose a simple yet effective scheme, called BlockAware [3],
which uses the expected block time to notify the node about its
blockchain view with respect to the network. As part of our
ongoing work, we are prototyping BlockAware over Bitcoin
Core to defend against the temporal attacks.
C. Logical Partitioning
To connect to the Bitcoin network, peers run a software
called Bitcoin Core that implements protocols of the system.
Bitcoin Core is an open source project that can be customized
and updated to implement new rules and policies. Since 2009,
there have been over 40 updates to Bitcoin Core, with the
latest, v0.16.0 released in February 2018.
Table II shows the distribution of Bitcoin software at the
time of our data collection. We observed that 288 Bitcoin
software variants are used by nodes. The latest version of
Bitcoin Core, 0.16.0, is used by only 36% of the nodes while
27% use version 0.15.1. The remaining 37% of the network
uses 286 different software clients.
Peer “democracy” in software selection has served well,
but is vulnerable to attacks. An attacker can release a modified
TABLE II. TOP 5 SOFTWARE VERSIONS USED BY BITCOIN FULL
NODES ALONG WITH THEIR RELEASE DATE, LAG FROM THE DATE OF
COLLECTION IN DAYS, AND PERCENTAGE OF USERS.
Index Version Release Date Lag Users %
1 B. Core v0.16.0 02-26-2018 59 36.28%
2 B. Core v0.15.1 11-11-2017 166 27.52%
3 B. Core v0.15.0.1 09-19-2017 219 5.01%
4 B. Core v0.14.2 06-17-2017 313 4.67%
5 B. Core v0.15.0 04-22-2017 369 2.05%
version of software client, contaminated with bugs and mal-
ware that can put the privacy of the user at risk. To obfuscate
the true nature of the software client, and to gain confidence
of the users, the attacker may also introduce useful features
in his software that offer better performance. One example is
Falcon, that provides faster connectivity and minimum delay
during transaction propagation [4]. Falcon is not malicious, but
it demonstrates the independence of peers to run a client that is
not part of Bitcoin Core. Logical partitioning can compromise
the privacy of a node running the malicious software version.
It may expose the user to privacy risks and theft.
Vulnerability to logical partitioning is due to the open
network protocol. A central authority to regulate client partic-
ipation would violate decentralization, and therefore, logical
partitioning attacks remain a vulnerability to be considered.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the vulnerability of Bitcoin
to spatial, temporal, and logical attacks. Our results show
that over time, Bitcoin nodes have become more centralized
among ASes, and therefore, more vulnerable to BGP attacks.
Additionally, due to the diversity in consensus and the use of
different software clients by different nodes, both temporal and
logical partitioning attacks are possible.
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